John Stuart Mill's and protecting minority opinions: Why (pages 1-3) does J.S. Mill argue that minority opinions should be protected and not censored by the government? Relatedly, what does he say about the errors/biases we have as members of a particular culture and a particular time period Libertyjudgment, the more he relies, with complete trust, on theinfallibility of the world' in general. And the world, to cachindividual, means the part of it that he comes into contactwith: his party, his sect, his church, his class of society.UThe faith he has in this collective authority... [means] thatmere accident has decided which of these numerousworlds' is the one he relies on: that the causes that makehim an Anglican in London would have made him a Buddhistor a Confucian in Peking. Yet it is as evident in itself as anyamount of argument can make it that ages are no moreinfallible than individuals, because every age has held manyopinions that subsequent ages deemed to be not only falsebut absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions nowgenerally accepted will be rejected by future ages as it is thatmany that have been generally accepted are now rejected.An objection that is likely to be made to this argumentruns somewhat as follows:To prohibit something (government authority] thinks to bepernicious is not to claim exemption from error, but toperform their duty to act, fallible though they are, on theirconscientious convictions. If we were never to act on ouropinions because they may be wrong, we would leave all ourinterests uncared for and all our duties unperformed. [...]Men and governments must act to the best of their ability.There's no such thing as absolute certainty, but there isassurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We maywe must-assume our opinion to be true for the guidanceof our own conduct; and that's all we are assuming when weforbid bad men to pervert society by spreading opinionsthat we regard as false and pernicious.5033átvJohn Stuart Mill-S9MacBook Air2: Liberty of thought and discussion[To this argument] I answer: No, it is assuming very much morethan that. There is the greatest difference between presuming anopinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contestingit, it hasn't been refuted, and assuming its truth as a basis fornot permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradictingand disproving our opinion is the very condition that justifies usin assuming its truth... (O]n no other terms can a human beinghave any rational assurance of being right.Look at the history of what people have believed; or look atthe ordinary conduct of human life. [-] [T]he majority ofthe eminent men of every past generation held many opinionsnow known to be erroneous, and did or approved many thingsthat no-one would now defend. Well then, why is it that thereis on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rationalopinions and rational conduct? [I]t is [because] the errors ofthe human mind can be corrected.A OThis quality of the human mind is the source of everythingworthy of respect in a human beings whether as a thinking oras a moral being. He is capable of correcting his mistakes bydiscussion and experience. Not by experience alone: theremust be discussion, to show how experience is to beinterpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually give wayto fact and argument; but facts and arguments can't have anyeffect on the mind unless they are brought before it. Very fewfacts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bringout their meaning. So, because the whole strength and value ofhuman judgment depends on a single property, namely that itcan be set right when it is wrong, it can be relied on only whenthe means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand.MALDIIAa John Stuart MillOn Liberty (1859)John Stuart MillCopyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reservedhttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/millFirst launched: March 2005LibertyIt is to be hoped that there is no longer any need to defendthe liberty of the press' as one of the protections againstcorrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we maysuppose, can now be needed for this:Chapter 2: Liberty of thought and discussionNo legislature or executive whose interests aren'texactly the same as the people's should be allowed totell them what to believe or to decide what doctrinesor arguments they shall be allowed to hear.John Stuart Millisn't likely that the government in a constitutional country,whether or not it is completely answerable to the people,will often try to control the expression of opinion-exceptwhen by doing so it expresses the general intolerance of thepublic. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government isentirely in harmony with the people, and never thinks ofcoercing anyone except in ways that it thinks the peoplewant. But I deny the right of the people to exercise suchcoercion, whether directly or through their government. Thepower of coercion itself is illegitimate. The best governmenthas no more right to it than the worst. It is at least asnoxious when exerted in accordance with public opinion aswhen it is exerted in opposition to it. If all mankind minusone were of one opinion, and that one had the contraryopinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencingthat one person than he would be in silencing them if hecould. You might think that silencing only one couldn't beso very wrong, but that is mistaken, and here is why.. Ifan opinion were a personal possession of no value exceptto the person who has it, so that being obstructed in theenjoyment of it was simply a private injury, it would makesome difference whether the harm was inflicted on only a fewpersons or on many. But the special wrongness of silencingthe expression of an opinion is that it is robbingnot one individual, but the human race,posterity as well as the present generation,those who dissent from the opinion as well as thosewho hold it.2: Liberty of thought and discussionIndeed, those who dissent are wronged more than those whoagree. If the opinion in question is right, they are robbedof the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; and if itis wrong, they lose a benefit that is almost as great, namelythe clearer perception and livelier impression of truth thatwould come from its collision with error.Last amended: April 2008This aspect of the 'liberty' issue has been so often and sotriumphantly enforced by previous writers that there is noneed for me to make a special point of it here. Though the lawof England regarding the press is as servile today as it wasthree hundred years ago, there is little danger of its beingactually enforced against political discussion, except duringsome temporary panic when fear of revolt drives ministersand judges from their proper course. Generally speaking, it2: Liberty of thought and discussionWe need to consider these two cases separately; each hasa distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. Wecan never be sure that the opinion we are trying to suppressis false; and even if we were sure of its falsity it would stillbe wrong to suppress it. [The first branch is dealt with right away:discussion of the second starts on page 22.]First, the opinion the authorities are trying to suppressmay be true. Those who want to suppress it will deny itstruth, of course; but they aren't infallible. They have noauthority to decide the question for all mankind, and excludeevery other person from the means of judging. To refuse ahearing to an opinion because they are sure that it is false isto assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolutecertainty i.e. that their being sure that P is the same asits being certainly true that P.. All silencing of discussion isan assumption of infallibility, which is a good argument forcondemning it; many people have used this argument, butit's none the worse for that.Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the factthat people are fallible doesn't carry nearly as much weightin practice as it is allowed to carry in theory. Everyoneknows perfectly well that he is fallible, but few think itnecessary to take any precautions against their own falli-bility, or allow that the errors to which they admit theyare liable might include some opinion of which they feelvery certain. Absolute monarchs, or others accustomed tounlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence intheir own opinions on nearly all subjects. People who lackthe disadvantages of monarchs and thus sometimes heartheir opinions disputed, and have some experience of beingset right when they are wrong, have the same unboundedconfidence only in such of their opinions as are shared byall around them, or by those to whom they habitually defer.For the less confidence someone has in his own individual

Question

John Stuart Mill's and protecting minority opinions:  Why (pages 1-3) does J.S. Mill argue that minority opinions should be protected and not censored by the government? Relatedly, what does he say about the errors/biases we have as members of a particular culture and a particular time period Libertyjudgment, the more he relies, with complete trust, on theinfallibility of the world' in general. And the world, to cachindividual, means the part of it that he comes into contactwith: his party, his sect, his church, his class of society.UThe faith he has in this collective authority... [means] thatmere accident has decided which of these numerousworlds' is the one he relies on: that the causes that makehim an Anglican in London would have made him a Buddhistor a Confucian in Peking. Yet it is as evident in itself as anyamount of argument can make it that ages are no moreinfallible than individuals, because every age has held manyopinions that subsequent ages deemed to be not only falsebut absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions nowgenerally accepted will be rejected by future ages as it is thatmany that have been generally accepted are now rejected.An objection that is likely to be made to this argumentruns somewhat as follows:To prohibit something (government authority] thinks to bepernicious is not to claim exemption from error, but toperform their duty to act, fallible though they are, on theirconscientious convictions. If we were never to act on ouropinions because they may be wrong, we would leave all ourinterests uncared for and all our duties unperformed. [...]Men and governments must act to the best of their ability.There's no such thing as absolute certainty, but there isassurance sufficient for the purposes of human life. We maywe must-assume our opinion to be true for the guidanceof our own conduct; and that's all we are assuming when weforbid bad men to pervert society by spreading opinionsthat we regard as false and pernicious.5033átvJohn Stuart Mill-S9MacBook Air2: Liberty of thought and discussion[To this argument] I answer: No, it is assuming very much morethan that. There is the greatest difference between presuming anopinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contestingit, it hasn't been refuted, and assuming its truth as a basis fornot permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradictingand disproving our opinion is the very condition that justifies usin assuming its truth... (O]n no other terms can a human beinghave any rational assurance of being right.Look at the history of what people have believed; or look atthe ordinary conduct of human life. [-] [T]he majority ofthe eminent men of every past generation held many opinionsnow known to be erroneous, and did or approved many thingsthat no-one would now defend. Well then, why is it that thereis on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rationalopinions and rational conduct? [I]t is [because] the errors ofthe human mind can be corrected.A OThis quality of the human mind is the source of everythingworthy of respect in a human beings whether as a thinking oras a moral being. He is capable of correcting his mistakes bydiscussion and experience. Not by experience alone: theremust be discussion, to show how experience is to beinterpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually give wayto fact and argument; but facts and arguments can't have anyeffect on the mind unless they are brought before it. Very fewfacts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bringout their meaning. So, because the whole strength and value ofhuman judgment depends on a single property, namely that itcan be set right when it is wrong, it can be relied on only whenthe means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand.MALDIIAa John Stuart MillOn Liberty (1859)John Stuart MillCopyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reservedhttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/millFirst launched: March 2005LibertyIt is to be hoped that there is no longer any need to defendthe liberty of the press' as one of the protections againstcorrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we maysuppose, can now be needed for this:Chapter 2: Liberty of thought and discussionNo legislature or executive whose interests aren'texactly the same as the people's should be allowed totell them what to believe or to decide what doctrinesor arguments they shall be allowed to hear.John Stuart Millisn't likely that the government in a constitutional country,whether or not it is completely answerable to the people,will often try to control the expression of opinion-exceptwhen by doing so it expresses the general intolerance of thepublic. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government isentirely in harmony with the people, and never thinks ofcoercing anyone except in ways that it thinks the peoplewant. But I deny the right of the people to exercise suchcoercion, whether directly or through their government. Thepower of coercion itself is illegitimate. The best governmenthas no more right to it than the worst. It is at least asnoxious when exerted in accordance with public opinion aswhen it is exerted in opposition to it. If all mankind minusone were of one opinion, and that one had the contraryopinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencingthat one person than he would be in silencing them if hecould. You might think that silencing only one couldn't beso very wrong, but that is mistaken, and here is why.. Ifan opinion were a personal possession of no value exceptto the person who has it, so that being obstructed in theenjoyment of it was simply a private injury, it would makesome difference whether the harm was inflicted on only a fewpersons or on many. But the special wrongness of silencingthe expression of an opinion is that it is robbingnot one individual, but the human race,posterity as well as the present generation,those who dissent from the opinion as well as thosewho hold it.2: Liberty of thought and discussionIndeed, those who dissent are wronged more than those whoagree. If the opinion in question is right, they are robbedof the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; and if itis wrong, they lose a benefit that is almost as great, namelythe clearer perception and livelier impression of truth thatwould come from its collision with error.Last amended: April 2008This aspect of the 'liberty' issue has been so often and sotriumphantly enforced by previous writers that there is noneed for me to make a special point of it here. Though the lawof England regarding the press is as servile today as it wasthree hundred years ago, there is little danger of its beingactually enforced against political discussion, except duringsome temporary panic when fear of revolt drives ministersand judges from their proper course. Generally speaking, it2: Liberty of thought and discussionWe need to consider these two cases separately; each hasa distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. Wecan never be sure that the opinion we are trying to suppressis false; and even if we were sure of its falsity it would stillbe wrong to suppress it. [The first branch is dealt with right away:discussion of the second starts on page 22.]First, the opinion the authorities are trying to suppressmay be true. Those who want to suppress it will deny itstruth, of course; but they aren't infallible. They have noauthority to decide the question for all mankind, and excludeevery other person from the means of judging. To refuse ahearing to an opinion because they are sure that it is false isto assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolutecertainty i.e. that their being sure that P is the same asits being certainly true that P.. All silencing of discussion isan assumption of infallibility, which is a good argument forcondemning it; many people have used this argument, butit's none the worse for that.Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the factthat people are fallible doesn't carry nearly as much weightin practice as it is allowed to carry in theory. Everyoneknows perfectly well that he is fallible, but few think itnecessary to take any precautions against their own falli-bility, or allow that the errors to which they admit theyare liable might include some opinion of which they feelvery certain. Absolute monarchs, or others accustomed tounlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence intheir own opinions on nearly all subjects. People who lackthe disadvantages of monarchs and thus sometimes heartheir opinions disputed, and have some experience of beingset right when they are wrong, have the same unboundedconfidence only in such of their opinions as are shared byall around them, or by those to whom they habitually defer.For the less confidence someone has in his own individual

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John Stuart Mill was a British philosopher, political economist, and social reformer, known for his…