(a) Consider the following bimatrix of a normal form game. Show that the set of strategies thatsurvive elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on the order in which the weaklydominated strategies are eliminated.Player 2LR1,1 0,0M| 1,10,0 | 2,1Player 12,1(b) Find an example of a game where the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies would notsurvive the eliminination of weakly dominated strategies.(c) Find an example of a game where both players' strategies are weakly dominated in the Nashequilibrium.

Given information Player 2 Player 1 L R T 1,1 0,0 M 1,1 2,1…

a) Consider the following bimatrix of a normal form game. Show that the set of strategies that survive elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on the order in which the weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. Player 2 L R T 1,1 | 0,0 Player 1 M 1,1 | 2,1 B 0,0 2,1 b) Find an example of a game survive the eliminination of weakly dominated strategies. the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies would not c) Find an example of a game where both players' strategies are weakly dominated in the Nash equilibrium.

a) Consider the following bimatrix of a normal form game. Show that the set of strategies that survive elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on the order in which the weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. Player 2 L R T 1,1 | 0,0 Player 1 M 1,1 | 2,1 B 0,0 2,1 b) Find an example of a game survive the eliminination of weakly dominated strategies. the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies would not c) Find an example of a game where both players' strategies are weakly dominated in the Nash equilibrium.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17P

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