Part 1 ( See Hint Two Cournot duopolists compete in a market with inverse demand given by p = 152.00 - 20, where p is the per-unit price, qi is the output for firm i (either firm 1 or firm 2), and Q = 91 + 92. Firm 1 has a cost function of c₁ (91) = 2₁₁ and firm 2 has a cost function of c2(92) = 392. Assume no fixed costs. What is the optimal output for firm 1? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) What is the optimal output for firm 2? (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 21 What is the equilibrium price in this market? $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Part 3 What is the profit for each firm? Firm 1 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) Firm 2 profit: $ (Round to two decimals if necessary.) See Hint See Hint

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Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the reaction curve of oligopolists? b) What will be the production of each of the companies? c) What is the selling price practiced by oligopolists? d) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? e) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will…

There are two ice-cream parols on a beach. The dayly demand for ice-creams is given by Q = 3252 - 7p. The average variable cost of an ice-cream is 83 while the rent of the place is 576. How many ice-creams is one company selling if the two ice-cream stands operate as Cournot duopolists? (Please use 2 decimals in your answer.)

Suppose you are employed at a monopolistic company as a research (pricing) economist and you are deriving the behavior of two markets based on demand curves given by: Di(P1) 3 50 — Pі D:(p>) — 50 — 2р2 Assume that the marginal cost is constant at $8 a unit. (a) If it can price discriminate, what price should it charge in each market in order to maximize profits? (b) If it can't price discriminate, what price should it charge?

Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists that produce identical products. Demand for the products is given by the following linear demand functions:P=200-QA-QBwhere QA and QB are the quantities sold by the respective firms and P is the selling price. Total cost functions for the two companies areTCA = 1500+55 QA +QA2TCB = 1200+20 QB +2QB2Assume that the firms form a cartel and maximize total industry profits,a. Determine the optimal output and selling price for each firm.b. Determine Frim A, Firm B, and total industry profits at the optimal solution foundin part (a).c. Show that the marginal cost of the two firms are equal at the optimal solutionfound in part (a).

The market demand curve for a pair of Cournot duopolists is given as P= 34 - 2Q, where Q =Qq+ Q2 The constant per unit marginal cost is 16 for each duopolist. Find the Cournot equilibrium price, total quantity, and total profits. (Round your answers to 1 decimal place (e.g., 32.1).) Equilibrium Price: 5:40 Quantity: d Profits: < Prev 10 of 10 Next 00:21 14/02/202. ere to search acer

Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? b) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will remain very close to what they are today and its profits will not increase"

2. Stackelberg Firms 1, 2 and 3 compete in quantities. The inverse market demand is given by p = 400 (91 +92 +93), where 91, 92 and q3 are the quantities produced by firms 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The marginal cost for firm 1 is c₁ = 20, and the marginal cost for both firm 2 and firm 3 is 40. The order of play is as follows: Firm 1 first sets a quantity q₁. Then, firms 2 and 3 observe q₁ and simultaneously set q2 and 93. Each firm sets its quantity to maximize its own profits. (a) Let us first consider the optimal action of firm 2. Given a value q₁ initially set by firm 1 and a value of q3 set by firm 3, what is the value of q2 that maximizes the profits of firm 2? Hint: Your answer should provide q2 in terms of 91 and 93. (b) Notice that, after firm 1 sets q1, a subgame starts, in which firms 2 and 3 simultaneously set q2 and 93. Given 91, find the values of q2 and q3 that firms 2 and 3 must set in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Hint: Your answer should provide q2 and q3 in…

6. Three oligopolists operate in a market with inverse demand given by P(Q) = a - Q, where Q = 9₁ +92 +93 and q; is the quantity produced by firm i. Each firm has a constant marginal cost of production, c, and no fixed cost. The firms choose their quantities as follows: (1) firm 1 chooses q₁ ≥ 0; (2) firms 2 and 3 observe q₁ and then simultaneously choose q2 and 93, respectively. What is the subgame-perfect outcome?