Please solve in 30 minute 4. King Leonidas and King Xerxes assemble their armies for a battle against each other. The kingwho brings more warriors wins the battle and gets control over Sparta. Both kings value thethrone of Sparta the same amount.King Leonidas can equip x warriors per 1000 gold coins spent and King Xerxes can equipy warriors per 1000 gold coins spent. Let E and y be drawn independently from a uniformdistribution with the support (0, z], z > 0.(a) Suppose that both z and y are observable. Show that there is no equilibrium in purestrategies in this game.(b) Suppose that Leonidas privately learns z and Xerxes privately learns y. How many warriorsfight in the battle between Leonidas and Xerxes?(c) Keep the assumptions made in 4b. Suppose that the god of war Ares loves large battles.Mighty Ares threatens to keep Sparta for himself if both kings bring less than a warriorseach. Find a that maximizes the size of the winning army on average.

Above game has following specifications - Two player - King Leonid & Xerxes Strategy set of…

4. King Leonidas and King Xerxes assemble their armies for a battle against each other. The king who brings more warriors wins the battle and gets control over Sparta. Both kings value the throne of Sparta the same amount. King Leonidas can equip r warriors per 1000 gold coins spent and King Xerxes can equip y warriors per 1000 gold coins spent. Let x and y be drawn independently from a uniform distribution with the support [0, z], z > 0. (a) Suppose that both r and y are observable. Show that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in this game. (b) Suppose that Leonidas privately learns r and Xerxes privately learns y. How many warriors Gebt in the httle

4. King Leonidas and King Xerxes assemble their armies for a battle against each other. The king who brings more warriors wins the battle and gets control over Sparta. Both kings value the throne of Sparta the same amount. King Leonidas can equip r warriors per 1000 gold coins spent and King Xerxes can equip y warriors per 1000 gold coins spent. Let x and y be drawn independently from a uniform distribution with the support [0, z], z > 0. (a) Suppose that both r and y are observable. Show that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies in this game. (b) Suppose that Leonidas privately learns r and Xerxes privately learns y. How many warriors Gebt in the httle

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Let there be two players in a game, Player 1 and Player 2. Consider a jar containing 5 snakes. 3 of the snakes in the Kjar are venomous, while the remaining 2 are non-venomous. In the game, both the players have to put their hand in the jar one after the other and pick a snake out. Each snake, if picked out of the jar, will bite the player's hand. The event of picking a venomous snake, or equivalently, a venomous snake's bite will earn the player zero points. On the other hand, the event of picking a non-venomous snake, or equivalently, a non-venomous snake's bite will earn the player one point. Let X denote Player 1's pick and let Y denote Player 2's pick. Suppose Player 1 is the first to pick out a snake. The expected value of Player 1's pick is: E(X)= (Express your answer as a fraction or round your answer to two decimal places)
A6. 1.Adam and Zoey are competing fish and chips sellers in Linear City. They are located at the twoopposing ends of the town’s 3-mile-long Main Street. The 1700 inhabitants of the town are distributeduniformly on Main Street and each of them eats at most one portion of fish and chips for lunch. People’sdisutility from getting to a fish and chips stand and back home amounts to $2 for each mile of distanceto the stand. The marginal cost of producing one portion of fish and chips is $9. The consumers areuniformly distributed along the street. Each consumer has a valuation of $29.0 for the product. Supposethat both Zoey and Adam can advertise at zero cost to inform everyone about their business. Find theequilibrium price of Zoey if neither of the two sellers advertises.
Player 1 Left Right Player 2 Player 2 Up Down Up Down Player 1 15, 20 30, 10 10, 50 Party Sleep 50, 50 200, 40 6. Use backward induction to find the SPE of the game depicted on the game tree shown above. Recall that Player l's payoffs are written first followed by Player 2's payoffs. What is Player 2's payoff in the SPE? а. 10 b. 20 с. 30 d. 40 е. 50
You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…
i want just explanation How does 8-1Q1= 8-Q2 become Q1+Q2= 10
Suppose there are two criminals who are thinking about robbing either an insurance company or a liquor store. The take from the insurance company robbery would be Gh50,000 each, but the job requires two people (one to do the robbing and one to drive the getaway car). The take from robing a liquor store is only $1000 but can be done with one person acting alone or both. What are the strategies of these players (the two criminals)? b. Write this situation in a normal game form assuming they are acting simultaneously. What are the equilibria for this game? (Note: Both Pure strategy and Mixed strategy) а. с.
N=2 video broadcasting websites, You and Twi, must decide the number of minutes of ads to be displayed for every video that the user elects to watch. Let tY be the number of ad-minutes per video set by You, and tT the number of ad-minutes per video set by Twi. Streaming one video costs You cY=0.02, while it costs Twi cT=0.03. There are 100 million potential users, and each watches videos according to the following demand curves: qY((tY,tT) =10-2tY+tT=10-2tT+tY a- What is the cross-price elasticity between You and Twi? b- Suppose, for now, that You and Twi enter an (illegal) agreement by which they set tY=tT=t Derive the total number of users in the market as a function of t. Derive the profits for each website as a function of t. c- Now let the two platforms compete by each setting their number of ad-minutes: i. What is the best reply of You? What is the best reply of Twi? ii. Find the Nash Equilibrium of the game. iii. How many total users choose You and how many total users choose…
Two coins are tossed : (a) if A, is the event that the first coin is a tail and A, is the event that the second coin is a tail and A, is the event that the second coin is a head are A, and A, mutually exclusive ? Obtain P(A, U A) and P(A, n A,), (b) if further the event A, is that both the coins are heads and A, is that both the coins are tails are A, and A, mutually exclusive ? Are they exhaustive ? Obtain P(A, UA,).
0 E F 3 2 FIGURE 2 23 D G 2 H 0 1 (2) Two friends, Albert (A) and Berta (B), have to decide on going to one of three bars, Xenia's (X), Yara's (Y), or Zana's (Z). They decide to select a bar by alternatively vetoing bars until one remains. First Albert vetoes a bar. If at least two bars remain, then Berta vetoes another bar. That process continues until a single bar remains unvetoed. Suppose Albert prefers Xenia's to Yara's to Zana's and Berta prefers Zana's to Yara's to Xenia's. Assume that, for each of the two, going to their most preferred bar gives a utility of 2, going to their next preferred bar gives a utility of 1, and going to their least preferred bar gives a utility of 0. Model this as an extensive form game and find its Nash equilibria. Which of the Nash equilibria are subgame perfect?
Consider an industry with two firms that are simultaneously deciding whether to make costly safety investments such as sprinkler systems in a plant or escape tunnels in a mine. Unlike the firms, potential employees do not know how safe it is to work at each firm. Firm 2 Employees only know how risky it is to work in this industry. If only Firm 1 invests, workers do not know that safety has improved at only Firm 1's plant. Because the government's accident statistics for the industry fall, workers realize that it is safer to work in the industry, so both firms pay lower wages. No investment Investment 600 300 No investment The profit matrix shows how the firms' profits depend on their safety investments. 600 750 Firm 1 Could cheap talk lead both firms to invest in safety? Why or why not? 750 675 Cheap talk Investment 300 675 A. cannot help the firms settle on a single equilibrium because the firms have a dominant strategy. B. can help the firms settle on a single equilibrium because the…
As a result of NAFTA what is Hecksher-Ohlin model concerning on labor intensive and capital intensive ?
8. Two states, A and B, have signed an arms-control agreement. This agreementcommits them to refrain from building certain types of weapons. The agreement is supposed tohold for an indefinite length of time. However, A and B remain potential enemies who wouldprefer to be able to cheat and build more weapons than the other. The payoff table for A (player1, the row player) and B (player 2, the column player) in each period after signing thisagreement is below. a) First assume that each state uses Tit-for-Tat (TFT) as a strategy in this repeated game.The rate of return is r. For what values of r would it be worth it for player A to cheat bybuilding additional weapons just once against TFT? b) For what values of r would it be worth deviating from the agreement forever to buildweapons? c) Convert both values you found in parts a and b to the equivalent discount factor dusing the formula given in lecture and section. d) Use the answers you find to discuss the relationship between d and r:…